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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT C LARSON, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
PPG INDUSTRIES, INC., a 
Pennsylvania corporation; 
DIAMOND SHAMROCK CHEMICALS 
COMPANY, a Delaware 
corporation; et al., 
Defendants-Appellees. 
Case No. 920711-CA 
Appellant petitions this court for a rehearing. By his 
signature below, counsel for appellant certifies that this petition 
is made in good faith and not for delay. A copy of this Court's 
opinion is attached. 
POINT I 
THE COURT MISAPPREHENDED THE EVIDENCE 
CONCERNING PLAINTIFF'S VISITS TO DOCTORS. 
This Court made the following assertions: "Further, although 
Larson occasionally sought medical attention for various systems, 
he made little or no effort to learn the cause of his systems until 
several weeks after viewing the unidentified television program in 
1984." (Slip Opinion at 3.) "It is undisputed that Larson never 
made an appointment with any doctor to discover the cause of his 
symptoms." (Slip Opinion at 3 n. 2.) These statements are based 
on an erroneous assumption that Mr. Larson had a neat package of 
obviously related symptoms and that a reasonable person in his 
place would have consulted a medical practitioner concerning those 
symptoms. This assumption fails to view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to Mr. Larson, as required where the issue is a 
factual question for the jury and the issue is decided on summary 
judgment. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991). 
The statement that "Larson never made an appointment with any 
doctor to discover the cause of his symptoms" is misleading. 
Larsons undisputedly did make appointments, many of them, to obtain 
treatment for the most damaging symptoms, mood swings and 
personality changes. (R. 564, 891.) Any technical distinction 
between making an appointment with a doctor to obtain treatment for 
symptoms and making an appointment to discover the cause of 
symptoms is only that—a technical distinction that should not have 
any bearing where the case is decided on summary judgment. 
It is also not material for purposes of summary judgment that 
many of the appointments were made by Mrs. Larson. First, one of 
the effects of the chemical exposure was that Mr. Larson was not 
fully aware of the changes in his personality. (R. 881-83.) 
Second, it is not unreasonable for a couple to divide tasks and for 
the wife to make doctor's appointments for the husband. 
Evidence that Mr. Larson consulted medical professionals 
concerning his injuries is found in Mrs. Larson's testimony: 
You know, we would go to counseling 
because that seemed to be what was wrong with 
him. It was these character changes and the 
stress. You know, going to these marriage 
counselors, you know, they're saying, "Well, 
there's stress. The headaches are caused by 
whatever stress he's having," or those kinds 
of things. 
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But I went to counseling probably, I 
don't know how often, but every time I 
couldn't handle it anymore. And I also went 
to my church people seeking help. 
Q So your perception of the problem 
was that it's the sort of thing that could be 
best addressed by counselors, psychologists, 
people involved in marriage counseling; is 
that correct? 
A Yes. Because we — that was the way 
— you know, that is what was manifesting at 
the time was his character — these incredible 
things that he would do and that was what was 
manifesting. So that is what kind of help we 
sought. 
Q. No, in your deposition, you 
testified that these problems were often more 
apparent on the weekends than during the week, 
would that still be your testimony? 
A Yes, that's true. May I say 
something to this? 
Q Sure. 
Q [sic] At the time we didn't know what 
was going on, you know, then and at that time 
in our lives and being young, we kind of 
internalized it thinking there was something 
wrong at home. Later when we started getting 
information about the chemical and knowing 
what it does to a person's body, we did find 
out that the reason that the weekends were 
more volatile was that he was going through 
withdrawals on the weekends when he was not 
around the chemical. And that explained a lot 
of that to us. 
(R. 564-65.) 
Larson also sought treatment for the headaches. Larson and 
those close to him, including his counselors, believed that the 
headaches were related to the marital stress (R. 1467) , and the 
headaches were more pronounced on weekends when Mr. Larson was away 
from work. (R. 1470.) In addition to the treatment from the 
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marital counselors, however, Mr. Larson did consult with the family 
doctor about the headaches and did receive medication for those 
headaches. (R. 566, 884-85.) The medication did not help and some 
of it caused more problems, so Mr. Larson did not seek further 
treatment. (Id.) Where this case was decided by summary judgment, 
it is irrelevant that Mr. Larson consulted with the doctor while 
there for one of his children, rather than making a separate 
appointment for himself. The important fact is that he sought and 
received treatment. Mr. Larson testified: 
Q Mr. Larson, did you often accompany 
your wife when she went to Dr. Young? 
A Probably half of the time, a third 
of the time. 
Q So you were there a number of times? 
A Yes. 
Q Was it not unusual to talk to Dr. 
Young about the problems you were having, 
headaches, so forth, on those occasions? 
We would always try and ask him something 
about it because it was already — we were 
already there. That's what we did. 
(R. 585-86.) A jury could conclude from this testimony that Mr. 
Larson often consulted his doctor to determine the cause of his 
problems, and that he exercised reasonable diligence to discover 
the cause of his problems. 
It is also important to note that Mr. Larson's failure to 
follow through on what others would deem important was itself a 
result of the chemical exposure. (E.g., R. 861-63.) 
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Over time, Mr. Larson's abusive behavior decreased. The 
Larsons reasonably believed it was a result of the marital 
counseling, not realizing that it was more likely the result of the 
reduced exposure to trichlorethylene. (R. 1473.) 
In summary, the Larsons, both of them, actively sought 
treatment for those symptoms which they believed were caused by 
marital stress. It was these problems which have caused the most 
injury to the Larsons. The Court's statement that Mr. Larson did 
not attempt to obtain treatment for his symptoms nor determine 
their cause overlooks or ignores this evidence. Larsons now know 
that all of these symptoms are related, but they did not know it at 
the time Mr. Larson was being exposed to trichlorethylene. Mr. 
Larson's failure to perceive the interconnectedness among the 
symptoms was reasonable, and a jury could so find. This Court 
should hold that there is an issue for the jury concerning whether 
Larson took reasonable steps to obtain treatment for his symptoms, 
and concerning whether he reasonably should have realized that all 
of these symptoms, which appeared at different times and had 
different effects, were all caused by the same chemical exposure. 
POINT II 
THE HARDSHIP OF DEFENDING THIS CASE DOES NOT OUTWEIGH THE 
PREJUDICE TO LARSON FROM BEING DENIED ANY CHANCE OF RECOVERY. 
In footnote 3 of its opinion (Slip Opinion at 4), this Court 
holds that "this is not the exceptional case where the statute of 
limitations should be tolled to allow a stale claim to be 
litigated." The Court purports to reach that conclusion by 
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balancing the hardship to Larson with the prejudice to the 
defendants, and states "we would have to determine that Larson's 
long delay in attempting to connect his symptoms with his exposure 
to TCE has severely prejudiced the defendants . . . .M Although 
the question of whether the discovery rule applies is a legal 
issue, Klinger v. Kiahtly, 791 P.2d 868, 870 (Utah 1990), the 
Court's analysis in this case is based on a factual determination. 
The Court starts the footnote by purporting to assume that "Larson 
met the threshold discovery test," yet refers to "Larson's long 
delay in attempting to connect his symptoms with his exposure to 
TCE." If the Court is in fact assuming that Larson took every 
reasonable step to discovery the cause of his symptoms, the Court 
is adopting a per se rule that individuals unwittingly injured by 
a toxic substance may not recover after a certain number of years, 
even though the state of medical science was such that they 
reasonably could not have made the connection between the toxic 
substance and the injuries. Such a per se rule is not warranted. 
This Court purports to assume, for purposes of footnote 3, 
that Robert Larson did make reasonable efforts to discover the 
cause of his injuries but was nonetheless unable to discover the 
cause. Based on that assumption, the balance of hardship against 
prejudice weighs in favor of Larson. The Court should determine 
that Larson's long inability to connect his symptoms with his 
exposure to TCE does not cause any prejudice to defendants greater 
than Larson's own inherent difficulty in attempting to carry his 
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burden of proof after these many years. See Klinger v. Kightlv, 
791 P.2d 872-73. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court's opinion misapprehends the evidence in this case 
and usurps the province of the jury. The most serious symptom to 
the Larsons was the injury to their marriage and family. The 
Larsons did actively seek treatment for that symptom. Most of the 
other symptoms appeared related to this primary symptom. This 
Court should hold that a jury issue existed concerning whether Mr. 
Larson made reasonable efforts to seek treatment for and determine 
the cause of those symptoms. 
The Court should further hold that the prejudice to the 
defendants from having to defend with stale facts does not outweigh 
the devastating prejudice to plaintiff from being denied recovery 
for his very real injury. 
DATED this 2L£tv day of August, 1994. 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for/J 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
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Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable John A. Rokich 
Attorneys: D. David Lambert, Leslie W. Slaugh, Provo, and 
Stanley R. Smith, American Fork, for Appellant 
Jay E. Jensen, Phillip S. Ferguson, and Karra J. 
Porter, Salt Lake City, for Appellees 
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Jackson. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Robert C. Larson appeals a summary judgment. The trial 
court ruled that the statute of limitations had run on Larson's 
claims several years before his complaint was filed and that the 
discovery rule did not apply to toll the statute. We affirm. 
FACTS 
In May 1964 Larson began working for Black and Decker as a 
tool repairman. His duties included disassembling tools, 
cleaning the parts in a solvent, and reassembling the tools. The 
solvent used was vaporized trichloroethylene (TCE). Larson used 
the TCE in a vapor degreaser on an average of 15 to 12 times per 
day over the next five years. Larson was promoted to manager in 
1969 and after that, used TCE only occasionally until 1972, when 
Black and Decker switched to a different type of solvent. 
Within a few months after being employed by Blac. a. 
Decker, Larson began experiencing physical and emoti^ al 
symptoms, such as headacnes, bleeding from the sinus ;, 
dizziness, mood changes, irritability, lack of sex c ive. imory 
loss. Larson also became abusive toward his wife z 1 far. y. 
Larson or Larsons wife occasionally asked the fam y pf ician 
about various symptoms. 
Larson contends that while watching an unide.'ified 
television program in 1984, he was alerted to the potential 
harmful effects of TCE. Four years later he filea this action. 
The trial court granted the defendants/ motion for summary 
judgment on the ground that Larson's claims were barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations. Larson appeals. 
ANALYSIS 
Larson contends that the trial court improperly determined 
that the discovery rule did not apply and thus did not toll the 
statute of limitations on his negligence and product liability 
claims. The applicable statute of limitations provides that 
Larson's causes of action must be brought within four years of 
when the action accrues. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3); Olsen 
v. Hoolev, 865 P.2d 1345, 1347 (Utah 1993).1 A cause of action 
accrues upon the happening of the last event necessary to 
complete the cause of action. Olsen, 865 P.2d at 1347; Myers v. 
McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981). In negligence and product 
liability cases, the last event necessary to complete the cause 
of action is injury or harm. Payne v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186, 189 
(Utah 1987); Williams v. Melbv. 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985); 
Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 156 (Utah 
1979). It is undisputed that by 1974 Larson was aware of all of 
the symptoms of which he now complains. Larson filed this action 
in 1988. Thus, the four-year statute of limitations had run when 
he filed his complaint. 
However, Larson argues that the discovery rule should toll 
the statute of limitations until 1984, the time he allegedly 
discovered that TCE caused his injury. Whether the discovery 
rule applies to a cause of action is a question of law, which we 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3, enacted in 1989, states that tne 
product liability cases must be "brought within two years from 
the time the individual who would be the claimant in such action 
discovered, or in the exercise of due diligence should have 
discovered, both the harm and its cause.11 Because Larson's 
action was filed in 1988, the four-year statute of limitations 
applies. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25-(3) (1988). 
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review for correctness. Klinaer v. Rightly, 791 P.2d 868, 870 
(Utah 1990). "Under the discovery rule, a statute of limitations 
does not begin to run until the plaintiff learns of, or in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of, the 
facts that give rise to the cause of action." Olsen, 865 P.2d at 
1348. Thus, Larson must make a threshold showing that he did not 
know and could not reasonably have known of the existence of his 
cause of action. See O'Neal v. Div. of Family Services, 821 P.2d 
1139, 1144 (Utah 1991). The mere ignorance of a cause of action 
does not prevent the running of the statute of limitations. 
Briaham Young Univ. v. Paulsen Constr., 744 P.2d 1370, 1372 (Utah 
1987) . 
Once that threshold test is met, the discovery rule may 
apply in one of the following circumstances: (1) when the 
Legislature has adopted the rule by statute; (2) when a defendant 
conceals the existence of facts giving rise to knowledge of a 
course of action; or (3) when application of the statute of 
limitations would be irrational or unjust where, because of 
exceptional circumstances, a plaintiff has no knowledge of the 
cause of action until after it is barred by the limitations 
period. Olsen, 865 P.2d at 1348; Klinaer, 791 P.2d at 872; 
Mvers. 635 P.2d at 86; Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan. 236 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 11, 13 (Utah App. 1994). Larson alleges the 
circumstances of his case are exceptional, thus requiring 
application of the discovery rule. 
We believe that Larson did not meet the threshold 
requirement of showing that he could not have reasonably known of 
his cause of action. As stated above, there is no question that 
by 1974, Larson was aware of all of the symptoms of which he now 
complains. In fact, the trial court found that he knew of most 
of the symptoms within the first months after his exposure to TCE 
in 1964 and 1965. Further, although Larson occasionally sought 
medical attention for various symptoms, he made little or no 
effort to learn the cause of his symptoms until several weeks 
after viewing the unidentified television program in 1984.2 
2. Larson alleges that a genuine issue of fact existed as to 
when he discovered all the facts relating to his injury. 
However, it is undisputed that Larson was aware of all of his 
symptoms by 1974. Larson also asserts that a material fact 
exists as to whether he made a reasonably diligent effort to 
determine the cause of the symptoms. We disagree. It is 
undisputed that Larson never made an appointment with any doctor 
to discover the cause of his symptoms. He merely asserts that 
when he or his wife took one of his children for visits to their 
doctor that he would occasionally question the doctor about 
(continued...) 
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Nothing prevented Larson from seeking to discover the •.. -use of 
the symptoms except perhaps his apparent reluctance tc /isi~ 
doctors and hospitals. Based upon these facts, Larsor a^n.;ot 
assert that he could not reasonably have known of the xistance 
of a cause of action. Larson's knowledge of the fact, of his 
injury and his failure to attempt to discover the cau.se preclude 
his reliance on the discovery rule. Because the four-year 
statute of limitations had run and because the discovery rule 
does not apply, Larson's claim was properly dismissed by the 
trial court.3 Because we have determined that Larson's claims 
2. (...continued) 
treatment for a symptom. Based upon undisputed evidence, the 
trial court properly concluded that he was not reasonably 
diligent in discovering the cause of his symptoms. See Klincrer, 
791 P.2d at 870. 
3. Even if we determined that Larson met the threshold discovery 
test, we would conclude that this is not the exceptional case 
where the statute of limitations should be tolled to allow a 
stale claim to be litigated. See Sew v. Security Title Co., 857 
P.2d 958, 963 (Utah App. 1993), In balancing the hardship the 
statute of limitation would impose on Larson against any 
prejudice to the defendants resulting from difficulties of proof 
caused by the passage of time, we would have to determine that 
Larson's long delay in attempting to connect his symptoms with 
his exposure to TCE has severely prejudiced the defendants by 
making nearly impossible for the parties to discover credible 
evidence concerning who supplied the TCE to Black and Decker, 
whether all applicable instructions and warnings were transritted 
by the distributors to the employer, whether Larson was exposed 
to other chemicals that could account for his symptoms, and 
whether the symptoms were actually caused by exposure to TCI. 
See Mvers, 635 P.2d at 87 (stating that once the threshold zist 
is met, in determining whether to apply the discovery rule, a 
court must balance the hardship the statute of limitations would 
impose on the plaintiff against any prejudice to the defendant 
resulting from difficulties of proof caused by the passage of 
time). 
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were barred by the statute of limitations, we need not address 
other claims raised by Larson and the appellees• 
NormaivH. Jackson, Jjrage 
WE CONCUR: 
R u s s e l l W. Bench, Judge 
Si<-£ 7T 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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